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The Ugly Truth: Insurgencies are Brutal
Robert Bunker
The recent release by WikiLeaks.org of over seventy thousand classified U.S. Military
documents pertaining to the insurgency in Afghanistan has generated immense media and public
interest and is being compared in scale to the release of the ‘Pentagon Papers’ in 1965 by Daniel
Ellsberg. Immediate U.S. governmental condemnations concerning unnecessarily placing troops
in harm’s way, on the one hand, combined with war crimes accusations, on the other, have only
served to heighten the rhetoric surrounding the posting of these documents on the Web. The
criminal and unauthorized manner in which this massive volume of documents was leaked has
only helped to further politicize and emotionally galvanize commentators taking sides on this
issue.
The intent of this short essay is to move past the hype, rhetoric, and passions of the moment and
get to the core of the issue at hand. The ugly truth has nothing to do with who released the
documents, why they were released, or even what political outcomes and potential policy fallout
will occur after the dust settles. The core issue at hand is that insurgencies, by their very nature,
are inherently brutal. This point was recently driven home after doing a considerable amount of
research and reflection on issues pertaining to insurgent use of targeted killing, via both the
techniques of assassination and political execution, and engaging in subsequent discourse on this
topic with insurgency warfare scholars and practitioners. Further sensitizing me to this truth is
that, prior to the insurgent analysis, I was recently involved in an edited book project on Mexican
drug cartels and the criminal insurgencies taking place within the lands of our Southern neighbor
with over twenty-five thousand dead since December 2006.
What these research projects have taught me, or should I say have reminded me - as over time I
have become detached, analytical, and emotionally shielded from the raw violence of the subject
matter - is that insurgencies can be just as, if not more, brutal than conventional military
engagements between opposing conventional armies. The release of this multitude of classified
documents is bringing this home to the American public and the rest of the world. How long this
heightened public awareness will last is unknown but, for the moment, a psychic emotional
shockwave has been unleashed by the bombshell posting of these documents on WikiLeaks.
Citizens of the United States, her friends, the neutral parties, and even her enemies are at the
moment in a heightened state of awareness concerning US involvement in the face of
insurgencies raging not only in Afghanistan but also in nearby Pakistan, in Iraq, and, for those
somewhat more cognizant of politics, in many other quarters of the globe.

The crux of the problem is that democracies loathe being involved in insurgencies. They are
nasty, brutish, and have a bad habit of being very drawn out. Afghanistan is now the longest U.S.
‘war’ on record if we can call it such. Both blood and treasure are often expended for no
perceivable reason and, at times, no clear cut distinction exists between the good guys and the
bad guys when loyalty can be bought and paid for in hard cash. Accountability can be nonexistent and despotic and corrupt regimes gleefully siphon off U.S. aid to enrich themselves,
their families, and their cronies. Hamid Karzai is in some ways a Ngo Dinh Diem or Nguyen
Van Thieu redux. Memories of Vietnam are never far from the surface when insurgency
becomes the topic of table discussion. In fact, Vietnam is an excellent touchstone with regard to
the sheer brutality surrounding an insurgency. Richard Schultz published a 1978 work on
terrorism, insurgency warfare, and the Viet Cong. Key statistical information on targeted
killings, kidnappings, and the brutality of the conflict in Vietnam is as follows:
¾ Between 1958 and 1965, approximately 36,800 kidnappings and 9,700 assassinations
occurred in South Vietnam
¾ …during 1957 (the year given most frequently for the serious expansion of the NLF
insurgency) a total of 472 officials were assassinated. This figure doubled during 19581959 and during the early 1960’s. The NLF eliminated on the average of fifteen GVN
officials a week
¾ In May 1961, Kennedy sent a “Special message to Congress” in which he attributed NLF
success to “guerillas striking at night, assassins striking alone—assassins who have taken
the lives of over 4000 civil officers in the last 12 months…by subversives and saboteurs
and insurrectionists, who in some cases control whole areas inside of independent
nations.”1
These statistics are in addition to the better-known insurgent and allied campaigns. From the
insurgent side, they pertain to casualties resulting from routine ambushes of U.S. patrols,
meeting engagements and firebase sieges, and booby traps set on jungle routes to kill and maim
U.S. troops. From the allied side, we of course have the U.S. ‘pacification campaigns’ at the
“boots on the ground” level, in addition to liberal amounts of close air support and strategic
bombing campaigns, targeted at the Viet Cong, North Vietnamese Army, and their supporters.
U.S. military deaths tallied out to about 58,000, Viet Cong and NVA deaths are estimated at
many times that level, while the indigenous populations caught in the middle of the mayhem
suffered at far worse levels— somewhere between 3 to 6 million dead if Laotians and
Cambodians are also included.2
Two mutually reinforcing strategies were thus being waged in Vietnam by the insurgents. The
first was one of targeted killing, kidnapping, political execution, and re-indoctrinization, to create
a shadow government. The second was a more overt guerilla campaign based on hit and run raids
and terrorist acts. In return, the U.S. responded with its own targeted killing programs against the
political cadre of the insurgents and fielded sizeable field forces to engage the armed guerrilla
groups in the countryside, villages, and larger urban areas. The drawn out and nasty experience
of the Vietnam conflict left the U.S. homefront visibly exhausted, shaken, and increasingly
divided. Memories of the Tet Offensive in 1968, Kent State in 1970, and the fall of Saigon in
1975 are forever part of the greater American psyche as are the stark images of both that naked
and burned Vietnamese child running on a road in terror after a napalm attack and the unsettling
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extrajudicial execution of a Viet Cong agent by means of a pistol shot to the head by a South
Vietnamese official.
Comparisons and mutterings of the historical American experience in Vietnam vis-à-vis the
active insurgencies of Afghanistan and Iraq where U.S. soldiers are deployed are generally
considered bad etiquette though, looking back, the same could be said of Lebanon— the Marine
Barracks bombing in 1983 is still a relatively open wound— and Somalia— remember the 1993
Mogadishu debacle immortalized in the work Black Hawk Down. The intent is not to raise the
specter of failure, though such potentials always exist, but rather to highlight the brutal nature of
insurgency itself. Just as the insurgency in Vietnam has been brutally characterized above so too
can we characterize those taking place in Afghanistan and Iraq. Readers, however, have no doubt
personally experienced the graphic and dark news stories and imagery themselves now for
almost a decade. No further discussion is thus deemed necessary though, compared to the earlier
Vietnam conflict, U.S. casualties have been relatively low. The recent WikiLeak has only
reminded us of what we already know— that brutality, and even war crimes, are part and parcel
of an insurgency environment even though our American citizens and others around the world
would rather too soon forget.
Insurgents, the states they are engaging, and the defenders of those states, spend an inordinate
amount of time and effort on concepts of legitimacy and illegitimacy, media spin, propaganda,
and the ilk. In some ways, insurgency and counter-insurgency are raw politics and government at
its most primal level. Who will ultimately govern, who will make decisions, and who will live or
die hang in the balance. Since the attack of 9-11, the American government, for reasons which
have been and continue to be contentious and hotly debated, has found itself locked in active and
ongoing insurgencies in both Afghanistan and Iraq. Basic questions pertaining to what strategies
to follow, i.e. whether we are willing to spill more American blood, and whether we even have
the financial resources to even continue fighting— are continually being raised. The specter of
cross border violence spilling over from the active narco-insurgencies in Mexico and the dire
security threats in Central America stemming from cartel and gang violence are also increasingly
gaining attention.
Within this broader context, the ugly truth that insurgencies are brutal must never be forgotten.
Democracies have little stomach for them because too many gray areas exist—the just causes are
quickly tarnished, allegations of war crimes and actual war crimes take place on all sides, and, as
in all conflict and war, the indigenous populations caught in the middle suffer the most.
Distressingly, more and more insurgencies are breaking out globally that seemingly require the
attention, and ultimately the blood and financial resources, of the United States to respond to
them. It is hoped, whatever administration is in power—be it Democrat or Republican— that
wise, measured, and grand strategic decisions will be made. It is far easier to wreck the position
and power of a state by undertaking the wrong international policies, especially as it pertains to
undertaking foreign wars, than to build up or regain the power and prestige lost. America has
been a great power throughout the 20th century. What has been gained over the course of a
century can be lost in only a few short years.
Thus, in a time of economic constraint and budget deficit, we must pick and choose which
insurgencies to be involved in, whether our own troops or those of proxies will fight them, and
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how encompassing our goals should be. Sometimes the limited mission of only mitigating the
threat to the U.S. homeland may be sufficient. Making the appropriate decisions will ensure that
we will be in a position of strength in the face of the specter of even more insurgencies on the
horizon—some of which are in our backyard, especially if, we openly accept the brutal nature of
the conflict that we are getting our troops into. Our intent is to ultimately fix our position as a
great power throughout the 21th century and the only way, as a nation, that we will be able to do
this is conserve our resources when we can and only get mired in insurgencies when the core
national security interests of the U.S. are imperiled. Such core interests should be openly
debated. The fact that insurgencies are inherently brutal and once we commit our troops to the
fight it is going to be a long haul need not be.
Notes
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